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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X (EYES ONLY)		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	NIO/USSR		X (EYES ONLY)		
17	NIO/SP		X (EYES ONLY)		
18	D/SOVA		X (EYES ONLY)		
19	C/ACIS		X (EYES ONLY)		
20	ER				
21					
22	OS				
	SUSPENSE		Date		

Remarks

[redacted]

Executive Secretary
27 Sept 85
Date

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~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90982

3716

September 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Memorandum

The attached memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz is forwarded for your information.

J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~WITH SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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SYSTEM II
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

September 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ GPS

SUBJECT: My Meeting With Shevardnadze

Despite all the advance publicity, as I told you over the phone, Shevardnadze had no new arms control proposals in our meeting this afternoon. In a private exchange with Bud McFarlane, however, Dobrynin said they would be forthcoming on Friday.

Shevardnadze told me in our tete-a-tete that the Gorbachev letter he will deliver to you contains Gorbachev's views on how the November meeting should go. Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev would focus on four areas: security, regional, and bilateral issues; and an agenda for the future. He indicated that the letter would suggest that these points be covered in a final document. I told him I thought we could begin work on such a document, but that our final position would be determined by how the substance was shaping up.

The tone of the general meeting was basically positive. There was a good deal of give and take; far more than with Gromyko and with more people on each side participating. Except for an initial exchange on our mutual desire for a positive November meeting, virtually the entire four hours were devoted to the issues being covered in the Geneva arms control talks.

I gave Shevardnadze an extensive presentation of our views on how to enhance nuclear stability, stressing that the underlying assumptions of the ABM Treaty and SALT I have been undermined. I made clear that we now need to get on with the process of radical reductions in offensive arms, reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty, and ensuring that the Treaty is fully observed. I made a particular point of emphasizing that we have concrete proposals on the table in Geneva which would produce substantial reductions in offensive weapons. I reaffirmed our intention to continue to abide by the ABM Treaty, and elaborated on our concept of strategic defense.

Shevardnadze basically had nothing new to say. While he stressed the need to define points of convergence in our positions (and even used the Soviet word for "compromise"), he reiterated at length the standard Soviet linkage between a ban on "space strike weapons" and offensive arms reductions. He did say that fundamental and laboratory research is permitted by the ABM

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Treaty. But when Bud McFarlane asked whether Soviet laser, directed energy, and ballistic missile defense programs were consistent with the Treaty, he ducked. An extensive discussion of the specifics of the ABM Treaty produced no agreement, but may be worth having our negotiators pursue in Geneva.

In a separate conversation, Dobrynin told Bud McFarlane that Gorbachev had made a special effort to be asked in his Time interview about you, so as to be able to say something positive. Bud said we'd noticed it, but could hardly be expected to be grateful for appropriate courtesies. Dobrynin indicated Gorbachev is looking for ideas for the personal touches which could be done in Geneva to create good imagery, including activities involving wives. Bud pointed out the negative impact of Soviet public shrillness and rhetoric in this regard and urged that the Soviets find a way to close the Nicholson case and avoid further MLM incidents.

I had a strong sense that Shevardnadze is a different, more approachable, person in private than when he is surrounded by his advisors. I believe your tete-a-tete with him Friday will be a good opportunity to get our views across and that I may be able to do some business during my private dinner that evening.

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